In formulating my perspective (I refrain from using the term ‘position’ in order to dispel any notion on the reader’s part that I will not abandon it in favor of a more fruitful one in the face of new valid evidence) on the character of any piece of our knowledge, I do not discuss in terms of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ truths but in terms of the degree of certainty with which we can know something. Hence, while I will not make a statement with the strength of “all truth is relative” I will gingerly declare that “we have no way of knowing anything for certain (not even this statement).” I sidestep logical consistency in favor of epistemic breadth.
Perhaps it is that things are potentially knowable and we do not yet know how to know them, which is why I include the parenthetical appendage. Can we know the things we don’t know we don’t know? I don’t think we can ‘know’ anything, whatever that means. Suppose we rigorously define knowledge, or any term for that matter. In prestating what those things are, are we then not limiting what those things can be? Suppose we were to standardize a particular means for gathering and validating knowledge and we subsequently declared the products of all other knowledge-accruing algorithms as not up to enough snuff to be declared knowledge. You’d get some bigoted scientists.
What interests me is the manner in which various purveyors of knowledge claim their authority. Let us examine the edifices of science and religion. From my limited experience with both I have observed that practicing scientists tend to base the validity of their claims upon the use of the scientific method to work as best as it can to deliver repeatable results. Religious folk claim validity for the knowledge proffered by their religion of choice on the basis of its being the word of an omnipotent creator. Let us dissect this admittedly brutish characterization and differentiate between the two parties’ sources of authority another time.
